LIVE
TASKS 24H265 policiesCOMPLIANT100.0%0 attestedOPERATORS32 signingRESTAKED0.04 NEWT—MEDIAN RESPONSE36sp99 36.0sRE-VERIFIED 24H—0 invalidatedBLOCK11,957,813Sepolia
NEWTON PROTOCOL · POLICY CLIENT

0x57f4…8d18revision 4 · current

0x57f4fb0a4a4b34ea51d47bc7c99c960b80a58d18 · 1 of 8 policies · Sepolia
REVISION
4 of 4
POLICIES
1 of 8
DISTINCT
1
RESPONSE EXPIRY
300 blocks
CHAIN
Sepolia
TASKS · 24H
0
ALLOW RATE
—
Every policy must allowFail-closed, and no short-circuit: every policy is evaluated even after one has denied, and a single denial denies the intent. The response expires 300 blocks after its reference block — the shortest expireAfter in the set, on slot 0.

Policies — 1

one Rego + WASM pair per slot
  1. 0
    wasmbafkreicdyh43c5vv42iunlojjcsaoqvnbzpswqrgk22c2alqjinf55pkbmregonewton_redstone.allow
    — rules— denyWASMspecHash 0x406f6dd0…
    max_list_age_secondsnot in schema691200
    policyParams — 36 bytes on chain0x7b0a2020226d61785f6c6973745f6167655f7365636f6e6473223a203639313230300a7d
Each module is evaluated against its own input — {"params": <this slot’s policyParams>, "wasm": <this slot’s WASM output>}. There is no shared data.wasm object and no cross-slot namespace, so slot 1 cannot read slot 0’s WASM output and a policy cannot be written to depend on its neighbours.
SET IDENTITY
POLICY_SET_DOMAINkeccak256("newton.policy.set")
chainId11155111
revision4
policies0xd0ff…3877@300
Task managerreads getPolicies() at task creation, then never again
policyId = keccak256(abi.encode(POLICY_SET_DOMAIN, chainId, client, revision, policies)), where policies is the complete ordered array with each entry’s parameters and expiry. Order is part of it, so a reorder alone is a new id.
WHAT A TASK FREEZES
A task carries this exact ordered set as its own snapshot, plus one WASM input per slot. Response validation reads that snapshot and never re-reads the client, so reconfiguring mid-flight cannot change what an in-flight task means — and replay proves it by recomputing the policyId over the snapshot and comparing against the task’s own.
The bound is MAX_POLICIES = 8, enforced on chain and mirrored in the operator, the enclave and the proof guest. An oversize set is rejected, never truncated, and an empty one is rejected too — there is no vacuous allow.

Configuration history

4 writes · newest first
RevPolicy setChangePoliciesConfigured byBlockTasks
4 · current0xdb7b1ec2…674didentical re-apply0xd0ff7aca199aeacc5f316b029a476da7684a3877—11,877,2130x4ad4…04e30
30x10596ed0…0a2cidentical re-apply0x95c66b29db62136094dc95e40c33cc524cfe4ba1—11,877,1930x73e4…a3870
20x34cb95f2…acd0identical re-apply0xd0ff7aca199aeacc5f316b029a476da7684a3877—11,877,1890xadd9…161c0
10x34addc48…adedfirst set0x95c66b29db62136094dc95e40c33cc524cfe4ba1—11,799,7020xaea7…3bf10
Every write mints a new policyId and revokes every attestation bound to the previous one, because the id commits the client, the chain, the revision counter and the exact ordered list — keccak256(POLICY_SET_DOMAIN, chainId, client, revision, policies). Revision 4 is the only one whose attestations are still spendable. One write here re-applied a byte-identical list. PoliciesUpdated fires anyway and the revision advances anyway, so that write changed nothing about the policies and still killed every outstanding authorization.

Task history — every revision

no tasksExport CSVJSON
No tasks match this scope yet.
The export carries one row per task with the frozen policy set in slot order, and it is the complete filtered history rather than this page. It has no per-policy verdict column: TaskResponse.allowed is a single boolean for the whole set, so which policy denied a task is in no record.